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1. Introduction   
One of the main motivations of the infrastructure privatization wave of the 1990s was to 
obtain a significant contribution from the private sector to the financing of the major 
investment needs of the poorest countries. Reforms, restructuring and guarantees were 
generally aimed at maximizing the access to private investment. More specifically, this meant 
reorganizing the sector to achieve a significant equity contribution in financing new projects. 
Initially, the private sector responded very positively, as illustrated by the major acceleration 
in private sector investment commitments during the first half of the 1990s. Average annual 
investment commitments totalled approximately US$62 billion between 1990 and 2002. This 
was significant, in that it represented 20 to 25% of the actual investment expenditures in the 
sector (DFID, 2003).  
More recent evidence provides a much less positive story (World Bank, 2003). 
Investment commitments peaked in 1997 and have since continued to drop. With a 
commitment level of US$47 billion, 2002 figures represented the lowest level of investment 
commitments in projects with private sector participation since 1994. This represents a 
decline of 30% compared with 2001, matched by a significant reduction in the number of 
projects reaching financial closure. 
This story adds a potentially serious element to the many issues associated with the 
reversal trend. Indeed, in addition to the fact that the drop in commitments is likely to slow 
down the ability of the poorest countries to meet their needs, a change in the nature of these 
commitments may further add to the burden of these countries. This is because, in many 
countries, there is a growing concern that the financing structure adopted by the operators 
may be increasingly switching from equity to private, mostly foreign, debt financing. 
1 
A progressive switch from private equity to private debt is likely to be difficult for two 
reasons. First, contrary to what is suggested by finance theory, in developing countries debt 
finance can be more expensive than equity finance when the effective short-term nature of the 
bonds markets is accounted for and the transaction costs associated are accounted for. This 
implies that sectors moving toward higher debt financing would be facing higher financing 
costs for future investment (Alexander et al., 2001).
2 Second, every dollar that enters a 
country would be matched by a much larger proportion of debt contracted by the private 
operators. The public debt needed to finance the operations in the past would then be replaced 
by private debt rather than by private equity.  
Besides the obvious balance of payments consequences, this evolution in the financing 
structure of the sector raises significant issues from the strict viewpoint of regulation. Indeed, 
more expensive debt and operators more leveraged in foreign currency imply higher risks, 
                                                 
1 See also Alexander and Shin (2003) on evidence of the increased role of bond financing in regulated industries 
2 This stems from a couple of reason. First, most of the debt is generally foreign debt since domestic capital markets are 
seldom developed enough to generate the required financing and in uncertain environments, risk premia tend to be quite high. 
Second and more importantly, debt financing in developing countries tends to be of short maturity. This implies that debt 
needs to be reissued or refinanced quite frequently by the operators and fairly high transaction costs. Indeed, interest rates are 
only a minor part of the cost of debt in developing countries. A large share of the cost is associated with complex fee 
structures charged by banks which in view of the short term nature of the associated financing instruments tend to be paid 
almost as frequently as interest payments.   3
higher cost of capital and hence higher tariffs. Ultimately, if there is indeed a marked trend 
toward increased debt financing, the typical hands-off position of regulators with respect to 
the financial structure of the regulated infrastructure industries may no longer be sustainable 
in developing countries, because in an increasing number of experiences debt ratios have been 
at the core of regulatory conflicts.  
Several recent experiences suggest that the concern seems to be justified. Both the 
experience of the 1997 multi-country Asian crisis and, more recently, the 2002 Argentinean 
crisis have resulted in the direct involvement of regulators in discussions of the financial 
structure of privatized infrastructure companies as a way of mitigating the social 
consequences of brutal changes in leveraging associated with foreign exchange crises (e.g. 
Estache (2004)). For companies that are highly leveraged in dollars, these devaluations 
resulted in major increases in debt service requirements which necessitated a choice between 
considerable average tariff increases, or a major scaling down of investment programs at 
existing local currency tariff levels. In both Asia and Latin America, the de facto erosion of 
real tariffs has been such that many operators are no longer compliant with the previously 
agreed conditions for obtaining more funds or refinancing debt with banks, and have hence 
also slowed down or stopped their investment commitments.  
But it is not only in developing countries that regulators have become aware, in recent 
years, of the relative importance of debt financing for regulated industries. The major 
telecommunications debt bubble of 1999-2000 resulted in a credibility crisis and a depression 
in equity values that have since diminished the operators’ access to capital.  In order to 
participate in the telecoms boom of the second half of the 1990s, major incumbent telephone 
companies had issued stock and took on excess debt to finance spending and acquisitions. 
Since the crisis, the companies have seen their market capitalization fall more than half since 
2000.  As credit rating agencies downgraded companies, the cost of borrowing increased and 
this in turn eroded the price benefits of the technological progress in the sector.
3  
With this background in mind, the main purpose of this paper is to document more 
systematically the evolution of the financial structure of the regulated companies in 
developing countries and some of the related policy consequences.  The paper focuses on 
some of the basic indicators available on the evolution of the capital structures for a large 
sample of regulated utility and transport companies in developing countries. The paper will 
not, however, seek to address the micro-level implications of these developments. When 
looking at the capital structures of regulated companies, obvious questions arise with regard 
to the impact of regulation in the companies’ financing choices, and the tools the regulators 
have at their disposal to influence these choices. These issues have recently been analyzed in 
depth in the context of utility sectors in developed countries (by OXERA (2003)). However, 
the set of issues in LDCs is more complex, and would warrant more extensive analysis to 
address them in sufficient depth.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the collected dataset and 
methodology used for estimations. Section 3 presents the results for the full set of data. 
                                                 
3 For more details see the various consultation papers of UK communications regulator, Ofcom, available on its website 
www.ofcom.gov.uk. For a discussion in the context of the water sector, see Correia da Silva et al. (2003) or Palmer (2003)   4
Section 4 discusses the evolution of leverage of the sector since the 1997 Asia crisis. Section 
5 summarizes the main results and raises the policy issues that seem to emerge from the 
simple analysis of the data presented in the paper. 
2.  Data and methodology 
The paper focuses on stock market listed companies operating in developing 
countries.
4 Distinction is made between utilities and transport companies. This is due to 
historical differences in the types of regulation and levels of competition between the two 
sectors, which have also influenced the financing structures in these companies. The utilities 
sample is further broken down into electricity, gas and water sectors, and the transport sample 
into infrastructure and services providers. However, the scope for detailed monitoring of the 
evolution of the financing structure for any company in developing countries is limited, since 
few regulators in these countries tend to collect this data systematically. Also, in many 
countries an increasing number of small local companies are taking over the public 
management and provision of services in sectors such as water and sanitation and transport 
services. Unless these smaller companies are listed, they will not be covered here. There is, 
however, a large enough set of companies that report their financial structure in their home 
countries to ensure the statistical representativeness of the sample collected here.  
The sample data were collected from the companies listed in the Thompson Financial 
Datastream database. Datastream holds accounting and financial market data for publicly 
traded companies in a large number of countries, collected from companies’ group financial 
accounts and regional data providers. The data were collected for a period of 12 years from 
1991 to 2002. The total number of observations in each year is presented in Table 1. A more 
detailed data description is provided in the Appendix. 
For utilities, the data are for 121 companies from 16 countries. These include 90 
electricity companies
5, 23 gas distribution companies and 8 water distribution companies. For 
transport, the data limitations were more constraining and required a more complex screening 
and aggregation process. Only companies that are at least partly subject to government 
regulation are considered. Attention is restricted to the following transport sub-sectors: rail 
and road passenger transportation companies, airlines and airports, and shipping ports. In 
order to have representative sample sizes, companies had to be aggregated into two 
categories, depending on whether they were transport service or transport infrastructure 
providers. The final dataset comprises 23 transport infrastructure and 23 transport service 
companies in 15 developing countries. 
                                                 
4 This is clearly a biased sample but it is the only one for which this kind of data is available. 
5 For the purposes of this study, both electricity transmission and distribution companies are included under the electricity 
sector.   5
Table 1: Data description 
  Utility sample  Transport sample 
 Year Electricity  Gas Water  Total Infrastructure  Services Total 
1991 16  2  0  18  3  3  6 
1992 19  3  0  22  5  4  9 
1993 25  4  1  30  5  6  11 
1994 28  6  2  36  5  8  13 
1995 30  8  3  41  7  9  16 
1996 46  12  4  62  9  10  19 
1997 50  15  7  72  11  14  25 
1998 51  16  7  74  10  14  24 
1999 73  21  8  102 18  19  37 
2000 80  21  7  108 20  22  42 
2001 84  20  8  112 22  23  45 
2002 82  20  8  110 19  23  42 
Source: Datastream. 
As was to be expected in the case of developing countries, the quality of the data is an 
issue. All necessary data were not available for all companies for all years, and there may 
therefore be gaps of one or more years in the time series of leverage ratios. This makes the 
aggregate sample somewhat unbalanced. As a result, although the number of companies in the 
sample increases steadily over time, there can sometimes be substantial changes in the 
identity of companies in the sample in each year. Although this does not affect the longer-
term trend, it might increase the volatility of average sectoral levels of leverage from year to 
year.  
When analyzing the impact of the 1997 Asian crisis, this volatility needs to be 
controlled, and therefore a balanced sample was constructed. This balanced sample covers the 
period from 1997 to 2002, and only considers companies that have a full time series of data 
for those years. For utilities, 54 companies fulfill this criterion, including 37 electricity 
companies, 14 gas distribution companies and 3 water companies. For the transport sector, the 
balanced sample contains 20 companies: 8 transport infrastructure and 12 transport services 
providers.  
The countries covered in the sample include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela for Latin America; China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand for Asia; and a residual group of important countries 
in the international investment world for infrastructure, including the Czech Republic, Russia, 
South Africa and Turkey. All data were collected in domestic currency.  
Table 2 describes the data types collected for these countries, and their definitions for 
the purposes of the calculations of the leverage ratios. While leverage can simply be defined 
as the ratio of the value of a firm’s debt to the combined value of the firm’s debt and equity, 
practical estimations can be more complicated, as several definitions of debt and equity can be 
used.    6
Table 2: Data types collected 
Data type  Definition 
Market value of equity  Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue 
Net debt  The total of all long- and short-term borrowings, less total cash 
and equivalent 
Total share capital and 
reserves 
The total share capital and reserves, including preference 
shares 
 
The equity capital of a firm can be measured in terms of either market or book value. 
From a theoretical perspective, the market value should be used, as it reflects all available 
information, and represents the present discounted value of the firm’s equity. Using market 
values, however, may expose the measured leverage to higher short-term volatility. Moreover, 
if the market value of equity is readily available for publicly traded firms, the market value of 
a company’s debt is often unobservable. Therefore, in many cases, leverage is estimated with 
the book value of debt. Also, in estimating a firm’s leverage, the debt maturities that are to be 
considered must be decided. This choice can be somewhat dependent on the purpose for 
which the leverage measure is estimated. In the academic literature, firms’ leverage measures 
have normally been based either on the total amount of debt, or on long-term debt only. 
The specific financial ratios calculated in this paper are shown in Table 3. Two 
leverage measures are produced: one based on the market value of equity and the other on the 
book value.
6  For both leverage measures, the debt is measured as the company’s net debt, 
which includes all long- and short-term liabilities but deducts the cash reserves. This is done 
because a firm may have considerable outstanding debt, but at the same time also hold a 
significant amount of cash. Therefore, using net debt in the leverage calculations can provide 
a more accurate indication of the firm’s true liabilities.
7 
Table 3: Financial ratios 
Ratio Definition 
Leverage(1)  Net debt/(net debt + market value of equity) 
Leverage(2)  Net debt/(net debt + total share capital and reserves) 
 
It may be useful to point out that despite the major differences in accounting rules that 
make international comparisons difficult, the data provided here may provide useful 
benchmarks for companies not covered by the sample. Whenever possible, we will compare 
the lessons to be learned from these two approaches. The former is potentially subject to 
significant levels of volatility, but is the most appropriate from a theoretical standpoint. The 
                                                 
6 In general, comparing company financial information across countries can be problematic due to different accounting 
practices. Although the majority of countries in the sample use accounting principles comparable to the North American 
GAAP, this is not consistently the case. For example, South Korea and Thailand’s models are closer to the model used in 
Germany and Japan. These differences may have an impact on leverage measures based on book values. 
7 It is notable that using a company’s net debt presents the possibility of negative leverage. If the amount of cash reserves 
exceeds the amount of debt (ie, net debt for the firm is negative), the observed leverage will also be negative.    7
latter, based on standardized accounting valuations, is much closer to what is readily available 
for operators in developing countries 
3.  Evolution of the financial structure during the 1990s 
This section reports the evolution of the two leverage indicators for developing country 
utilities in section 3.1, and for transport companies in section 3.2.  Whenever the sample sizes 
are statistically representative, we also report the results for specific geographical areas.  
3.1 Results for the full sample of utilities 
Table 4 shows the results of the leverage analysis based on market and book equity 
valuation,s respectively. The figures are averages across all identified companies for the three 
utility sectors, and key results can be summarized as follows.
8 
•  Electricity—when measured using market value of equity, electricity shows the 
highest leverage; moreover, there is evidence of a clear increase in the average 
leverage levels over time. Leverage(1) has increased from a low of 15% in 1994 to 
over 40% in 2002. However, this trend is not observed when the leverage ratios are 
based on book values of equity. Leverage(2) has fluctuated steadily at around 30%, 
with no apparent long-term trend. 
•  Gas distribution—according to the market valuation of equity, the average leverage 
for this sector has increased steadily over the period from below zero in 1991 to close 
to 40% in 2002. According to the book valuation of the leverage ratio, leverage (2), 
the trend looks slightly different. After a substantial jump at the beginning of the 
period, the average leverage has remained stable at between 20% and 30%, increasing 
to slightly above 30% in 2002. 
•  Water—the average leverage for water companies is generally lower than for 
companies in the other two sectors, and does not display any clear upward or 
downward trend. The time-series is also more volatile, and experiences some 
considerable fluctuations from year to year. Both leverage(1) and leverage(2) have 
very similar patterns over time, and have largely stayed close to 10–20% in recent 
years. 
 
                                                 
8 All results are unweighted averages across the relevant samples. Furthermore, the use of the median rather than the mean 
was preferred due to some data outliers.   8
Table 4: Average leverage by sector, based on all identified data (%) 
  Leverage 1 - Market based  Leverage 2 - Accounting based 
Year Electricity  Gas  Water Electricity  Gas  Water 
1991 28.6  -2.5  n.a. 28.7  -14.2 n.a. 
1992 26.7  0.4  n.a. 32.7 0.9  n.a. 
1993 17.8  5.0  -21.6 25.9 21.3  -107.2 
1994 14.2  9.2  -10.5 18.8 24.6 -16.4 
1995 21.7  14.5  7.9 33.1  29.3 5.8 
1996 18.7  10.1  5.8 20.1  25.7 4.9 
1997 22.7  18.3  7.5 20.0  25.8  32.7 
1998 36.4  23.8  24.4 24.6 28.8 36.4 
1999 36.1  29.3  10.2 23.2 35.1 18.4 
2000 35.1  36.7  1.8 25.3  29.6 6.2 
2001 39.5  39.2  17.4 26.0 33.6 13.0 
2002 44.0  39.2  26.3 31.6 38.2  7.9 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
 
The sample covers companies from different geographical areas and institutional 
backgrounds. Therefore, apart from considering sectoral differences, it is of interest to 
compare leverage ratios across geographical areas. Table 5 presents the average results for 
leverage(1) and leverage(2), calculated across countries in three geographical areas. The 
results are again unweighted averages and are based on all identified data. Overall, the figures 
show some regional differences in the way the utilities are financed. The most important 
results can be summarized as follows. 
•  South America—measured by leverage(1), South American utility companies have 
increased their leverage levels considerably over the last 10 years. The average level 
of leverage has been rising throughout the period, reaching almost 60% in 2002. 
However, the same trend is not observed with regard to leverage(2). When book value 
of equity is used, the leverage has remained practically constant, at close to 30%. A 
slight jump can be observed from 2001 to 2002. 
•  Asia—the average leverage for Asian utilities follows a very similar pattern to the 
South American utilities. The average increase in leverage(1) has not been as large 
over the last five years, but the trend has been very similar. The average leverage(2) 
has fluctuated between 20 and 40%.  
•  Other—the third group of countries consists of mainly Eastern European countries. 
The capital structures of utility companies in these countries have typically been 
characterized by low levels of debt. Both market and accounting based measures of 
leverage have remained low over the period, fluctuating around 0%.  
•  Overall: the Asian and South American utility sectors appear to be characterized by 
very similar levels of leverage. In Eastern European countries, the utility companies 
seem to be significantly less debt-financed.   9
 
Table 5: Average leverage by geographical area, based on all identified data (%) 
  Leverage 1 - Market based  Leverage 2 - Accounting based 
Year South 
America 
Asia Other  South 
America 
Asia Other 
1991 25.4  27.9  -3.6 28.2 31.1  -25.7 
1992 27.0  26.2  -24.2 29.5 48.4 -79.4 
1993 19.6  6.9  3.8 21.5  27.0  12.0 
1994 13.3  9.8  7.9 17.3  25.4 1.7 
1995 21.0  18.4  5.4  27.9 32.5 -15.1 
1996 21.7  13.6  0.2 26.2  26.1 0.2 
1997 23.1  31.4  0.5 21.1  33.5 0.5 
1998  41.8 28.2 -0.1 31.4 28.9 -0.1 
1999 38.7  33.0  8.8 31.2  33.1 8.6 
2000 42.8  35.0  2.0 28.7  29.6 6.3 
2001 52.1  36.1  4.7 30.4  33.0 1.4 
2002 59.3  39.2  -10.0 37.7 37.0  -5.4 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
 
3.2  Results from the full sample of transport companies 
Table 6 reports the estimated levels of leverage across the two types of transport 
company in developing countries. The numbers clearly show that the average leverage levels 
in the transport services sector appear to have been increasing over the period. The increase 
seems more pronounced when the market value of equity is used in the calculations. In the 
transport infrastructure sector, the development has been slightly different. The leverage 
levels seemed to have reached their peak around 1999, after which there has been a rapid 
decline. A similar pattern is observed for both market and book value based measures.    10
Table 6: Average leverage by sector, based on all identified data (%) 
  Leverage 1 – Market based  Leverage 2 – Accounting based 
Year  Infrastructure Services Infrastructure Services 
1991  26.2 37.7 21.6 53.5 
1992 3.6  44.2  16.9  59.7 
1993  19.3 31.2 37.2 48.1 
1994  15.3 20.7 50.9 40.8 
1995  25.4 33.4 41.6 47.8 
1996  23.2 22.4 36.6 38.7 
1997  38.1 62.7 36.5 53.0 
1998  41.1 60.6 45.5 62.0 
1999  41.1 54.7 31.4 67.6 
2000  46.8 47.4 23.9 55.1 
2001  36.5 57.3 18.9 46.5 
2002  13.8 58.2 10.9 50.5 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
The key results for each sector can be summarized as follows. 
•  Transport services—transport service providers in developing countries appear to be 
characterized by relatively high levels of leverage. When the market value of equity is 
used in the calculations, there is evidence of a gradual upward trend over the past 
decade. The average leverage(1) has increased from below 40% in 1991 to 58% in 
2002. When leverage is measured by the book value of equity, the average leverage 
appears to fluctuate at around 50%, without any clear upward or downward trend. 
However, a dip is observed in this measure of leverage after 1999. This is not only 
high when compared to other sectors, it is also high compared to similar sectors in 
developed, countries where leverage rates, as defined, here tend to be around 30%. 
•  Transport infrastructure—the increase in average leverage up to 2001 was more 
pronounced in this sector. When measured with leverage(1) in Figure 3.1, the average 
leverage has increased from close to 0% in 1992 to close to 40% in 2001. However, a 
significant decrease is observed from 2001 to 2002. However leverage(2) does not 
exhibit a similar upward trend in the mid–1990s. Although the average leverage(2) 
seemed to have increased from 20% to 50% between 1991 and 1994, this has been 
followed by a steady decline to 10% in 2002. 
The geographical disaggregation for transport companies is less meaningful because of 
the smaller sample size. The main distinction that can be made is between Asian companies 
and companies from other parts of the world. This is reported in Table 7 below. For Asian 
companies, the trend in leverage has been broadly similar, regardless of whether market or 
book values of equity are used, although, pre-1996, the level of leverage(2) remained higher 
than that of leverage(1). Both leverage measures experience a substantial jump after 1996 and 
peak in 1998, but have been decreasing steadily since then.    11
For companies in other countries the trends of the two measures behave differently 
over time. Leverage(1) remained at relatively low levels until 1997, after which there was a 
considerable increase; the average leverage(1) reached close to 60% in 2001. Leverage(2), by 
contrast, exhibits a reasonably stable trend over the period. Apart from the peak in 1998 the 
measure has been fluctuating between 20% and 40%. However, the trends over time can be 
somewhat sample–specific. In the years prior to 1998 there are only a few companies in the 
‘other countries’ sample, suggesting that the average leverage presented here is not likely to 
be a fully representative indicator of transport companies’ capital structure choices across 
these countries. Overall, it appears that the trends in transport companies’ leverage have been 
similar across this geographical distinction. The levels of leverage have also been converging 
towards the end of the period.  
 
Table 7: Average leverage by geographical area, based on all identified data (%) 
  Leverage 1 – Market based  Leverage 2 – Accounting based 
Year  Asia Other Asia Other 
1991  52.3 21.2 48.1 21.6 
1992  33.2 11.4 43.0 30.6 
1993  26.7 26.2 40.7 38.3 
1994  18.9 34.6 46.1 38.4 
1995  29.4 23.9 48.8 25.0 
1996  23.2 24.8 38.7 19.6 
1997 52.3  6.8  53.8  16.4 
1998  59.6 59.2 60.6 63.9 
1999  52.8 54.8 53.7 43.9 
2000  46.3 47.6 39.3 24.8 
2001  37.6 57.8 34.2 38.5 
2002  37.1 52.1 30.7 30.0 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
 
4. A more precise look at the evolution since the 1997 Asian crisis  
 
In developing countries, the concern with the financing structure of regulated 
companies started approximately with the slowdown in the interest in project finance resulting 
from the 1997 Asian crisis. Since this crisis also corresponds to the beginning of the overall 
slowdown in the commitments made by the private sector to infrastructure investment in 
developing countries, it is important to make a more precise assessment of the evolution of 
the situation. Having a high-quality sample of data is essential for this purpose. Indeed, while 
the relatively high volatility of average leverage levels observed due to the unbalanced full 
sample does not have much impact on the overall long-term trend, which was presented in 
section 3, it may interfere with the analysis of the impact. To control for this, results were also 
produced for the balanced sample which covers a much lower number of countries and 
companies, but which includes the same companies for each year between 1997 and 2002. 
The utilities sector is covered in section 4.1 while transport is covered in section 4.2.    12
 
4.1 Impact of the Asian crisis on the financial structure of utilities  
 
Table 8 presents the results for the balanced sample with regard to the average 
leverage levels in the three utility sectors for the 5-year period following the Asian crisis. 
 
Table 8: Average leverage by sector, balanced data (%) 
  Leverage 1 – Market based  Leverage 2 – Accounting based 
Year Electricity  Gas  Water Electricity  Gas  Water 
1997 22.2  13.4  7.5 19.2  25.0  41.9 
1998 41.3  20.8  24.4 24.6 28.5 36.4 
1999 35.6  26.5  21.6 23.2 32.5 40.0 
2000 42.7  31.6  19.2 25.9 27.3 27.6 
2001 39.6  30.2  26.0 28.4 32.9 17.8 
2002 42.9  27.4  48.6 34.5 29.1 8.7 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
According to the market valuation of assets, there appears to be a clear upward trend 
in leverage ratios in all sectors. As expected, the acceleration started right after the 1997 crisis 
as companies saw the real market value of their equity drop. Moreover, for many of the 
companies, the debt level did not change, or actually increased, in local currency terms, 
because, for many of the operators, the debt is often contracted in foreign currency. After a 2-
year slowdown in the acceleration, the debt/equity ratio has again started increasing following 
the stock market bust in 2000. The highest leverages are still observed in the electricity sector, 
and the lowest for the water sector, suggesting that lenders perceive risk to be lower in the 
energy sector than in the water sector in developing countries. For the electricity sector the 
results from the balanced sample closely resemble those based on all identified data reported 
earlier. The average leverage(1) has increased significantly from just above 20% in 1997 to 
above 40 % in 2002. 
The book valuation tells a slightly different story. For electricity and gas, leverage(2) 
does not exhibit an increase similar to that revealed by the market valuation leverage. It stays 
virtually constant between 20% and 30% after the 1997 Asian crisis, with only a slight 
upward trend. For water companies, however, there is a marked difference between the two 
leverage ratios. Leverage(1) starts from an average level of below 10% and gradually 
increases over the period to almost 50% in 2002. In contrast, the average level of leverage(2) 
for water companies was close to 50% in the beginning of the period, and has declined 
substantially over the period to about 10% in 2002. For this sector, however, it is important to 
remember that the companies’ local equity valuation may have been driven up by a series of 
strategic changes in the size and management of the global parent companies with which they 
were associated. The sector is now controlled by four major players that have acquired many 
of their smaller competitors during this period—i.e. many of the smaller Spanish water 
companies that were key players in Latin America in the earlier years of privatization have 
been acquired by the two largest French companies. Also, the equity appreciation of these   13
companies enjoyed through their diversification in other business lines is likely to have had 
some local spillover effects.  
It is also worth highlighting an interesting regional finding arising from the results.  
Both leverage indicators suggest that the financing policy of operators in Latin America was 
much more dramatically influenced by the Asian crisis. Indeed, while there was a small 
increase in Asia from 25% to 40% in the leverage rate based on market values, the major 
increase was observed in Latin America, which has seen its leverage rate more than double as 
a result from the Asian crisis. These developments are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Average leverage by geographical area, balanced data (%) 




Asia Other  South 
America 
Asia Other 
1997 20.9  25.6  -2.6  21.1  30.6  -2.7 
1998 42.3  28.2  0.1 30.2  28.9 0.1 
1999 37.7  34.3  5.5 33.7  36.4 3.6 
2000 50.0  33.3  2.0 38.2  29.6 0.8 
2001 51.8  36.3  4.7 42.5  32.5 1.4 
2002 52.9  42.9  -12.8 51.4 29.2 -6.0 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
4.2 Impact of the Asian crisis on the financial structure of transport operators 
 
Table 10 presents the results for the balanced sample with regard to the average 
leverage levels in the two transport sub-sectors. The results from the balanced sample analysis 
are somewhat different to those based on all identified data. Namely, the leverage ratios from 
the balanced sample show significantly higher stability than the unbalanced sample ratios 
over the same time period. The availability of data for transport companies has increased 
considerably during the past five years and, as a result, the number of companies in the full 
sample almost doubled between 1997 and 2002. Therefore, the trends observed in the full 
sample over this period may reflect new data becoming available, rather than companies 
choosing to alter their capital structures. The results from the balanced sample suggest that 
this might indeed be the case. However, evidence from both samples suggests important 
information about the transport companies’ capital structure choices.   14
Table 10: Average leverage by sector, balanced data (%) 
  Leverage 1 – Market based  Leverage 2 – Accounting based 
Year  Infrastructure Services Infrastructure Services 
1997  45.1 52.8 46.9 51.6 
1998  41.1 60.6 46.4 62.3 
1999  41.1 54.7 39.5 64.9 
2000  49.9 47.4 30.6 64.3 
2001  47.4 53.9 31.3 56.0 
2002  29.7 56.1 17.2 59.4 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
  The main messages arising from Table 10 can be summarized as follows. First, both 
the Asian crisis, and, to a lesser extent, the 2000 stock market bust did have an initial impact 
on the leverage of these companies. However, it appears that this impact was short–lived, and, 
at least in terms of the market–valued leverage rate, has returned to its initial level. Second, up 
to 2001 there seems to have been a negative correlation between leverage in infrastructure and 
service transport companies. Indeed, they seem to have reacted with opposite signs to the Asia 
crisis. The transport service companies have seen their leverage increase, while the leverage 
of transport infrastructure operators has declined significantly since 1997. While there is no 
simple explanation to this fact, it may be reasonable to assume that the infrastructure sector is 
likely to be slower to react to shocks since their investments tend to be heavier and start from 
stronger initial equity commitments. These commitments tend to be more effective at 
reflecting risks and hence require fewer adjustments. Also, large investment commitments and 
hence borrowing requirements in the sector are easier to spread out over time than they may 
be for services.  
  Overall, the transport services sector continues to be characterized by a relatively high 
level of leverage, measured by both leverage(1) and leverage(2). Both measures point toward 
an average leverage of 55–60%. Also, the trends of the two measures appear to be very 
similar over this period. As for transport infrastructure, the two measures of leverage appear 
to behave quite differently over time. Leverage(1), based on the market value of equity, has 
increased over the period and remained above 40% up until 2001. A significant drop to 30% 
is observed in 2002. While the book–valued average leverage(2) starts at a similar level as the 
market–valued leverage(1) in 1997, it has decreased more quickly, standing at 17% in 2002. 
 
5. Summary and policy implications 
 
The evidence presented in this paper seems to confirm the anecdotal evidence:  debt is 
replacing equity in the financing of the investment needs of utilities and transport services in 
developing countries. Even if this observation is not obvious from the leverage calculated 
from book values of equity, it is quite strong when considering the market valuation of equity 
over the past 10 years. Moreover, the results presented here point toward an acceleration of   15
this trend, which is particularly strong during the periods of global shocks that followed the 
1997 Asian crisis. Similar increases have been observed in developed countries.  
The data collected suggest differences across sub-sectors. With a market valuation of 
equity, since the 1997 crisis, the average leverage levels in electricity have been growing 
above 40% while the rates for water and gas have reached the 25-30% range.  The companies 
in the transport services sector appear to hold higher levels of debt, regardless of whether 
market or book valuations are used. In general, the data point to leverage levels of around 10-
20% for infrastructure and close to 50-60% for services, depending on whether the market or 
book valuation is adopted.       
Finally, the data suggest significant regional variations in both levels of leverage and 
in trends over time. South American companies appear relatively highly leveraged when using 
market valuations of equity, and increasingly so, driving the overall trend. Leverage rates 
have in fact been well over 50% in recent years.
9 Asian operators are also showing an upward 
trend in their leverage but at a much lower rate. The level has been in the 30-35% range for 
utilities and somewhat higher for transport companies. However, there appears to have been a 
decrease in leverage of Asian transport companies over the last five years, which is not 
observed elsewhere. Other regions, and in particular Eastern Europe, have been characterized 
by significantly lower levels of leverage than Asia and Latin America, and no obvious change 
in trend. 
From a policy viewpoint, this analysis points to a number of emerging issues that may 
deserve consideration. The first is the choice of the correct asset base in the context of 
regulatory decisions. This paper has shown that the stockmarket valuations and the book 
values of the operators’ equity have tended to vary significantly, since the observed increases 
in the market value-based leverage ratios were at least partly driven by depressed equity 
valuations.
10 Figure 1 underlines the importance of this point. The average book-to-market 
values for companies operating in privatized infrastructure sectors have increased 
significantly over the past 10 years. This suggests that, while for most standard regulatory 
decisions, the book value provides an easier and less volatile asset base, it can be misleading 
in that it does not allow the regulators to get a sense of the real concerns the operators have to 
address in their management of infrastructure services. An increase in the relative importance 
of debt in the financing of public services can be, and has in the past been, an issue that only 
appeared too late on the radar screen of the regulators. The evidence reviewed here would 
suggest that it is important for regulators to monitor both book and market valuations of the 
assets. 
The second policy issue is the extent to which regulation can mitigate the equity flight 
from the sector documented in this paper. Experience suggests that there are three main ways 
in which regulation can help. The first is the specific design of regulation. There is evidence 
suggesting that the cost of equity is lower under rate of return regulation or hybrid regimes 
than under price cap regulation (Estache et al., 2003; Foster et al., 2003; Rodriguez-Pardina 
and Sember, 2003). Increasing the willingness to contribute equity can thus be facilitated by 
                                                 
9 See Foster et al. (2003) for a similar conclusion. 
10 Note the wedge between book and market valuation of assets can also come from a bubble in the valuation of equity, not 
just from a depression in this valuation.    16
the adoption of less-efficiency-oriented regulatory regimes. Second, guarantees and various 
types of insurance can reduce the overall risks of projects, and hence reduce the risk of equity 
flight from the sector (Erhardt and Irwin, 2003). Third, the level of debt can be limited by 
other instruments, such as leasing agreements and allowing specific arrangements with 
infrastructure vendors. In some business lines, creative business development will allow 
improvements, but in most regulated industries facing low-income wage earners as their main 
client, cost control of some type is likely to be the solution.  The main question that remains 
to be solved is then the extent to which cost cutting and creative business development appear 
the best ways to improve the operators’ capability to finance their investments and debts.     






1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Transport service Transport infrastructure Electricity Gas Water
Source: Datastream, authors’ calculations. 
  Overall, these suggestions do not eliminate the fundamental problem that these 
sectors still need to find the necessary levels of finance to deliver on their investment 
commitments. Ineffectiveness in reducing the equity flight from the sector is likely to reduce 
the speed at which countries will be able to rely as much as they had hoped for on the private 
sector to help them finance their investment needs. But there is also a macroeconomic reason 
for concern. It is not unreasonable to expect that for some countries foreign participation is 
highly concentrated in these sectors, and increased international debt levels resulting from a 
switch from equity in public services may have balance of payment effects.   
These concerns  do not imply that regulators should regulate the financial structure of 
the company, but it certainly implies that it may be important for regulators to better monitor 
the leverage rates and their evolution to minimize the risks of unexpected shocks. It will also 
require a much serious commitment by all stakeholders to deliver the regulatory accounting 
systems needed to increase the transparency of the monitoring of the financial viability of 
companies that ultimately are responsible for delivering basic services in the poorest countries 
of the world.   
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Appendix: Description of the main sample for utilities 








Included in  
balanced 
sample 
Central Costanera   Argentina  Electricity  9  9  YES 
Capex S.A.   Argentina  Electricity  7  7  YES 
CELESC - Sta Catarina   Brazil  Electricity  8  9  YES 
CERJ   Brazil  Electricity  3  3   
CESP Brazil  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Energetica Mato Gros   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Elec Paulista Ctep   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
AES Tiete SA  Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Duke Energy Int'l   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Sao Carlos Empreend   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
CIA De Minas Gerais   Brazil  Electricity  9  11  YES 
CIA Paulista - Cpfl   Brazil  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Light De Eletricidad   Brazil  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Centrais Eletricas   Brazil  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Bandeirante Energia   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Emae-Aguas Energia   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Tractebel Energia SA  Brazil  Electricity  5  5   
Caiua Eletricidade   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Elektro - Eletricida   Brazil Electricity  4  4   
Light Participacoes   Brazil  Electricity  7  7  YES 
Electropaulo Metropo   Brazil  Electricity  7  7  YES 
Centrais Elet Matogr   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
CIA Eletrec. Bahia   Brazil  Electricity  7  8  YES 
CIA Energetica De Br   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
CIA Do Ceara-Coelce   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
Espirito Santo Centr   Brazil  Electricity  4  4   
General De Electric   Chile  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Empresa Electrica – EMELARI  Chile  Electricity  5  5   
Electrica De Iquique   Chile  Electricity  5  5   
Colbun SA   Chile  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Empresa Electrica – EDELMAQ  Chile  Electricity  5  5   
Empresa Elect – PEHUENCE  Chile  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Emp Elect Pilmaiquen   Chile  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Empresa Electrica – EMELAT  Chile  Electricity  5  5   
Empresa Electrica - ELECDA Chile  Electricity  5  5   
Empresas Emel S.A.   Chile  Electricity  3  3   
Almendral S.A.   Chile  Electricity  4  4   
Electrica Rio Maipo   Chile  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Emp Nac Electricidad   Chile  Electricity  7  7   
Enersis S.A.   Chile  Electricity  10  10     19
CIA Electrica   Chile  Electricity  4  4   
Chilectra S.A.   Chile  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Gener S.A.  Chile  Electricity  10  10   
Shenergy Company Ltd   China  Electricity  9  9  YES 
Inner Mongolia   China  Electricity  3  3   
HC Elec Pow Develop   China  Electricity  2  2   
Shandong Intl.Power   China  Electricity  2  2   
Huaneng Pwr.Intl.  China  Electricity  3  5   
Beijing   China  Electricity  6  7  YES 
SP Power Development   China  Electricity  4  4   
SZ Electric Power Co   China  Electricity  2  2   
Zhejiang Southeast   China  Electricity  6  6  YES 
Prazska Energetika   Czech Republic  Electricity  7  7  YES 
Stredoceska Energeti   Czech Republic  Electricity  4  4   
Jihomoravska Energet   Czech Republic  Electricity  7  7  YES 
Severomor Energetika   Czech Republic  Electricity  7  7  YES 
Vychodoc. Energetika   Czech Republic Electricity  7  7  YES 
Jihoceska Energetika   Czech Republic Electricity  7  7  YES 
Zapadoces Energetika   Czech Republic Electricity  7  7  YES 
Severoces Energetika   Czech Republic  Electricity  6  6   
Ahmedabad   India  Electricity  10  10  YES 
Gujarat Industries   India  Electricity  8  8  YES 
Bses Limited   India  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Tata Power Co   India  Electricity  10  10  YES 
Tata Hydro-Electric   India  Electricity  7  7   
CESC Limited   India  Electricity  2  2   
Sarawak Enterprise   Malaysia  Electricity  11  11  YES 
Tenaga Nasional Bhd.   Malaysia  Electricity  10  10  YES 
Powertek   Malaysia  Electricity  6  5   
Malakoff   Malaysia  Electricity  10  10  YES 
Hub Power Company   Pakistan  Electricity  6  6  YES 
Kohinoor Energy Ltd   Pakistan  Electricity  4  4   
Duke Energy   Peru  Electricity  3  3   
Luz Del Sur Servicio   Peru  Electricity  3  3   
Manila Electric (Meralco)  Philippines Electricity  11  11  YES 
First Phil. Holdings   Philippines Electricity  10  10  YES 
Krasnoyarskenergo   Russia  Electricity  6  6  YES 
AO Lenenergo   Russia  Electricity  3  3   
AO Mosenergo   Russia  Electricity  4  4   
AO Sverdlovenergo   Russia  Electricity  3  3   
Unified Energy   Russia  Electricity  5  5   
Electrosila   Russia  Electricity  2  2   
AO Bashkirenergo   Russia  Electricity  2  5   
Korea Electric Power   South Korea  Electricity  12  12  YES 
Electricity Generating   Thailand  Electricity  8  8  YES   20
Aksu Enerji VE  Turkey  Electricity  3  4   
Zorlu Enerji   Turkey  Electricity  3  4   
Ayen Enerji   Turkey  Electricity  3  4   
Ak Enerji Electrik   Turkey  Electricity  3  4   
Cukurova Elektrik  Turkey  Electricity  5  5   
Metrogas S.A.   Argentina  Gas Distribution  9  9  YES 
Transpra Gas Del Sur   Argentina  Gas Distribution  4  6   
Distrib. De Gas   Argentina  Gas Distribution  4  4   
Gas Natural Ban   Argentina  Gas Distribution  4  4   
Cia De Gas De Sao Paulo  Brazil  Gas Distribution  4  4   
GASCO S.A.   Chile  Gas Distribution  12  12  YES 
CEM SA   Chile  Gas Distribution  9  9   
Gujarat Gas Co Ltd   India  Gas Distribution  7  7  YES 
EOX Group Bhd   Malaysia  Gas Distribution  7  7  YES 
Gail (India) Ltd   India  Gas Distribution  6  6  YES 
Petronas Gas   Malaysia  Gas Distribution  7  7  YES 
Sui Southern Gas Co.   Pakistan  Gas Distribution  1  1   
Sui Northern Gas   Pakistan  Gas Distribution  2  2   
Kyungnam Energy   South Korea  Gas Distribution  9  9  YES 
Korea Gas Corp.   South Korea  Gas Distribution  4  4   
Daegu City Gas   South Korea  Gas Distribution  4  4   
Seoul City Gas   South Korea  Gas Distribution  8  8  YES 
Daehan City Gas   South Korea  Gas Distribution  8  8  YES 
Kyung Dong City Gas   South Korea  Gas Distribution  6  6  YES 
Kukdong City Gas   South Korea  Gas Distribution  7  7  YES 
Pusan City Gas   South Korea  Gas Distribution  6  6  YES 
LG GAS   South Korea  Gas Distribution  6  6  YES 
Aygaz A.S.   Turkey  Gas Distribution  12  12  YES 
Saneamento Sao Paulo   Brazil  Water  5  5   
Aguas Andinas S.A   Chile  Water  6  6   
Shanghai Raw Water   China  Water  10  10  YES 
Ades Alfindo Putrasetia   Indonesia  Water  9  9  YES 
Intan Utilities   Malaysia  Water  5  5   
Puncak Niaga Hdgs. Bhd  Malaysia  Water  6  6  YES 
Ionics Inc.   Philippines  Water  8  8  YES 
Eastern Water Resources   Thailand  Water  6  6  YES 
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Appendix 2: Description of the main sample for transport 








Included in  
balanced 
sample 
Gpo.Concio.Del Oeste  Argentina  Infrastructure  3  3   
Doc Imbituba PN  Brazil  Infrastructure  4  4   
Agunsa Chile  Infrastructure  4  4   
Froward Chile  Infrastructure  4  4   
Puerto Chile  Infrastructure  4  4   
Ventanas Chile  Infrastructure  12  12  YES 
Shai.Intl.Airport China  Infrastructure  2 2   
Shai.Shentong Metro   China  Infrastructure  4  4   
Zhejiang Expressway   China  Infrastructure  5  6   
Citra Marga Nusaphala  Indonesia  Infrastructure  8  8  YES 
Bintulu Port Holdings  Malaysia  Infrastructure  2  2   
Johor Port  Malaysia  Infrastructure  7  7  YES 
Malaysia Airports Hdg.   Malaysia Infrastructure  4  4   
Ncb Hdg.Bhd  Malaysia  Infrastructure  11  11  YES 
Plus Expressways Bhd  Malaysia  Infrastructure  1  1   
TMM   Mexico  Infrastructure  11  11   
Asian Terminals  Philippines Infrastructure  7  7  YES 
Intl.Ctnr.Term.Svs. Philippines Infrastructure  11  11  YES 
KCTC South  Korea  Infrastructure  12  12  YES 
Bangkok Expressway  Thailand  Infrastructure  8  8  YES 
Celebi Hava Servisi  Turkey  Infrastructure  3  3   
Turk Hava Yollari  Turkey  Infrastructure  5  5   
Terminales Maracaibo  Venezuela  Infrastructure  2  2   
Varig Pn  Brazil  Services  4  7   
LAN Chile  Services  6  6  YES 
China Eastern Airline  China Services  6  7  YES 
Hainan Airlines   China  Services  6  6  YES 
Shai.Qiangsheng Hldg  China  Services  3  3   
SHANDONG Airlines  China  Services  3  3   
Shn.Hong Kai Group   China  Services  2  2   
Steady Safe  Indonesia  Services  8  8   
Zebra Nusantara  Indonesia  Services  8  8  YES 
Malaysian Airline Sy.  Malaysia Services  10  10  YES 
Nationwide Express  Malaysia  Services  7  7  YES 
Park May  Malaysia  Services  10  10  YES 
See Hup Consolidated  Malaysia  Services  5  5   
Tiong Nam Transport 
Holdings
Malaysia Services  9  9  YES   22
Holdings 
Transmile Gp.  Malaysia  Services  6  6  YES 
PIAC Pakistan  Services  4  4   
Aeroflot Russia  Services  4  4   
Putco South  Africa  Services  4  4   
Value Group  South Africa  Services  4  4   
Chunil Express  South Korea  Services  12  12  YES 
Korea Express  South Korea  Services  12  12  YES 
Korean Airlines  South Korea  Services  11  11   
Thai Airways Intl.  Thailand  Services  11  11  YES 
 